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The focus on corporate governance has increased since the past few decades in most countries around the 
world, especially in the wake of corporate collapses in early 2000s. These corporate collapses have leads 
to the growing volume of academic and practical research in this area. Although the quantitative literature 
on corporate governance is diverse and extensive, the qualitative research in this area is rather limited.  
This paper provides a review of prior qualitative research on the corporate governance to guide future 
research on corporate governance. Qualitative study method allows the researcher to gather rich 
information in this area. 
  
1. Introduction 
The focus on corporate governance has increased since the past few decades in most countries around the world, 
especially in the wake of financial crises and economic collapse (Brown & Caylor, 2006). The 1997 Asian 
financial crisis has highlighted serious weaknesses in the Asian‟s capital markets framework which include its 
corporate governance regime, and thus, demonstrated the needs for effective corporate governance (Mitton, 
2002). Later, the beginning of the new millennium has seen the discovery of a variety of accounting frauds and 
scandals in the USA (Enron, Worldcom, Tyco International etc). This trend was not confined to the US only but 
also to other countries including Europe (Parmalat), UK (Shell), Bre-X and YBM Magnex (Canada), Royal 
Ahold (Netherlands), Credit Lyonnais and Vivendi (France), Metalgesellschaft (Germany), HIH Insurance Ltd. 
(Australia), Transmile and Technology Resources Industries Berhad (Malaysia). Following these corporate 
collapses, corporate governance reforms have become important issue globally. Many countries have issued 
Codes of Best Practices in Corporate Governance that address the basic governance issues of board 
effectiveness and accountability to bring greater power balance within the firm. A number of comprehensive 
reports on the corporate governance have been developed around the world (i.e. the Blue Ribbon Committee, 
1999 and Sarbanes Oxley, 2002 in the USA, the Smith Committee, 2003 and Cadbury Committee, 1992 in UK,  
ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003 in Australia, Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, 2000 in 
Malaysia, Singapore Code of Corporate Governance, 2001 in Singapore, Hong Kong Corporate Governance 
Code, 2004 in Hong Kong) to strengthen the corporate governance system. Most of the reports have 
documented that specific institutional features of corporate governance will affect the credibility of the financial 
reporting. Accordingly, several changes were introduces to reinforce the quality of corporate governance, 
including board of directors and audit committee effectiveness, internal audit function and external audit 
practices (FRC, October, 2010b). 
   Since the corporate collapses, there is a growing volume of academic and practical research in this area. 
Although the quantitative literature on corporate governance is diverse and extensive, the qualitative research in 
this area is rather limited.  Given the lack of qualitative study in this area, this paper provides a review of prior 
qualitative research on the corporate governance to guide future research on corporate governance. Qualitative 
study method allows the researcher to gather rich information and gain deeper understanding of a phenomenon 
under study. In this study, we have performed a literature review to provide a basis for considering more 
qualitative studies in corporate governance and its practice implications. The literature review includes major 
themes from 15 governance-related articles published in 2000-2013. This paper mainly focuses on key actors in 
corporate governance which are management, board of directors/ audit committee, internal audit function and 
external audit.  The motivation for this study arose from the various calls for alternative research methods 
(McNulty et al., 2013; Ahrens et al., 2011; Carcello et al., 2011; Beasley et al., 2009; Turley and Zaman, 2004; 
2007) to be employed, in addition to the predominantly archival and survey approaches of prior studies.  
   The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses overview on the corporate 
governance and corporate governance in literature, followed by the method used in this study. The following 
section describes key insights from the selected 15 qualitative studies on governance. We then discuss practice 
implications of the findings of the selected studies. The paper ends with a summary with a brief explanation on 
limitations and suggestion for future research. 
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1.1 Corporate Governance Overview 
Corporate governance has become an important element in identifying company‟s strengths and functions 
(Norwani et al, 2011). It provides a structure to monitor the performance of the company. Good corporate 
governance should provide good information and suggestions to the board of directors and the management to 
achieve the firm‟s objectives and facilitate effective control (OECD, 2004). Cadbury Committee (1992) has 
defined corporate governance as the system by which companies are directed and controlled.  Meanwhile, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Corporate Governance Principles (2004) 
defined corporate governance as the relationships among the management, Board of Directors, controlling 
shareholders, minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Generally, these definitions highlight the 
importance of interactions among governance mechanisms and the structure needed for effective governance. 
Gramling et al. (2004) and Cohen et al. (2004) documented that there are four important mechanisms of 
corporate governance include management, boards of directors, internal audit functions and external audit. 
Therefore, the roles play by these key mechanisms is essential to the success of good governance. Good 
mechanisms such as an independent board of directors, effective audit committees and internal audit function, 
and others are needed to help management to control their companies. 
   The board is one of important component of a company whereby it should be efficient and provide maximum 
transparency of a company‟s performance. The board of directors also should maintain a sound system of 
internal control of the organizations. This component of a company needs other groups, such as the audit 
committee, internal audit function and external audit, to complete their effectiveness (Davidson et al., 1996). A 
good board of directors will ensure the external auditor performed good audit service in order to improve the 
financial reporting. In the meantime, the board need effective audit committee and internal audit function in 
provide insights of the company performance. The current corporate governance around the world has 
recommended the organizations to have a well-balanced and effective board of directors in order to have a good 
internal corporate governance system.  
   As an operating committee for board of directors, audit committees should play their roles to ensure the 
success of corporate governance by monitoring management‟s actions, in terms of financial reporting, risk 
management as well as internal control (DeZoort et al., 2002).  The audit committee has responsibilities towards 
the audit function and it includes the relationship of the organization with its auditors. Since the beginning of 
21st century, the audit committee effectiveness has been the center of various researchers‟ interests, typically on 
the relationships between audit committee and external audit. This relationship is particularly important in the 
process of enhancing the quality of corporate governance system (Bishop et al., 2000).  
   Meanwhile, the internal audit function is in the best position to help other key players to understand the firm‟s 
internal control system, the level of compliance with the system and firm‟s risk management (Suwaidan and 
Qasim, 2010). Most of the literature documented that the internal audit function can improve corporate 
governance and there is growing importance and expanded roles of internal audit function in ensuring quality of 
corporate governance (Gramling et al., 2004). Historically, internal audit function has not been necessarily the 
focus on responses to the corporate collapses and scandals. However, nowadays, the internal audit function has 
been considered as one of the key elements in improving the systems of business reporting and internal control 
(Bailey et al., 2003). Studies have also revealed the ability of internal audit function to contribute towards 
quality corporate governance through its oversight role, its improvements to the control and monitoring 
environment (Coram et al., 2008). 
   External auditors also play a vital role in the governance of organisations. The need for an independent 
external audit of the financial statements is widely acknowledged to provide assurance to stakeholders of 
managers‟ stewardship of the firm‟s resources (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). External audits serve a vital 
economic purpose and play an important role in serving the public interest to reinforce trust and confidence in 
financial reporting. An external audit provides an independent check on the work of agents and of the 
information provided by an agent, which helps to maintain confidence and trust. Accordingly, the interests of 
the shareholders can be protected. Given its important roles, the external audit reporting should consider other 
governance mechanisms to achieve audit effectiveness and high quality of financial reporting (Cohen et al., 
2007). 
   Eventually, the key mechanisms in governance play important role in improving the governance system as 
well as quality of financial reporting (Rezaee et al., 2003). Therefore, the interactions among these key 
mechanisms are particularly vital in improving overall governance system and to ensure that stakeholders 
receive the highest quality financial reports.  Given the importance of these key mechanisms, the prior studies of 
corporate governance particularly on these key mechanisms are discussed in the following section. 
 
1.2 Corporate Governance in Literature 
Since the corporate collapses, the research in corporate governance has growing and evolving. Hundreds of 
studies in various areas of corporate governance have been published especially after the corporate collapses 
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events. Carcello et al. (2011) have examined key insights from 12 prior literature reviews or meta-analyses that 
address some portion of the corporate governance literature in accounting and auditing. From these meta-
analyses studies, the authors highlighted the fundamental relation between good governance characteristics and 
good accounting and auditing outcomes. For example, the analysis reveals that a positive relation between a 
variety of „„good‟‟ governance characteristics and a variety of „„good‟‟ accounting outcomes (fraudulent 
financial reporting, restatements, earnings management/accruals quality, and accounting conservatism and 
accounting quality). “Good” governance characteristics refer to the characteristics of the boards of directors and 
audit committee. The authors further argued that good boards are mainly focus on board independence, whilst 
good audit committees are mainly focus on audit committee financial expertise and independence. Carcello et al. 
(2011) has provided detailed insights on the prior study in corporate governance. However, most of the studies 
discussed in this paper are focused mainly on the quantitative studies conducted in this area.  This is further 
supported by Turley and Zaman (2004) who documented that most of the published articles in governance are 
using quantitative approach (archival which usually using publicly available data or questionnaires). 
   The studies using quantitative approach are typically suited for examining the association between governance 
inputs (board and audit committee characteristics) and various outputs (i.e. firm performance, earnings 
management etc.). However, using merely archival method cannot be sufficient to analyses the processes in the 
corporate governance (i.e. the effectiveness of the board and audit committee in performing their roles and 
responsibilities). Therefore, a qualitative approach incorporating interviews, case study, observation or others 
are essential in analyzing the processes in the corporate governance (Cohen et al., 2010). The qualitative 
research is particularly important as it is more open-ended and flexible (Patton, 2002) compared to the 
quantitative research. Qualitative research also provides a basis for challenging some of the dominant 
assumptions about how governance processes are actually function (McNulty et al., 2013).  
   McNulty et al. (2013) recently have explored the qualitative studies conducted in the corporate governance. 
Using 78 qualitative articles published in 11 journals from 1986 (first included paper) through 2011, the authors 
analysed some key characteristics of each paper. This would include date of publication, country of the 
qualitative scholars‟ attributed work institution, number of scholars, journal‟s title, main topic, discipline and 
theoretical perspective, number of disciplinary frameworks, theoretical aim, research setting, number of research 
settings, sources of data, number of sources of data, and level of analysis. The results of the study suggest that 
the qualitative studies on corporate governance have growing (with dominant focus on the board of directors) 
but there is still limited qualitative studies published work on corporate governance. This is supported by the 
study by Bluhm et al. (2011) who documented that the interest in and influence of qualitative research appears 
to be growing. However, qualitative researchers still face a number of added barriers compared to the 
quantitative researchers when trying to publish their work. McNulty et al. (2013) also documented that most of 
the qualitative studies in governance are mostly developed by UK scholars and published in European journals. 
From their findings, McNulty et al. (2013) call for qualitative studies of corporate governance practice as there 
is much scope for more qualitative studies which explore the array of interactions and processes involved in 
corporate governance, across different levels of analysis and contexts. The authors also suggested more 
qualitative research on the other key mechanisms other than board of directors as the prior qualitative research is 
most attentive to the study of boards of directors.  
   From the discussion above, we can see the importance of the qualitative studies on corporate governance. 
Thus, it is appropriate to discuss the evidence available in the literature concerning the corporate governance 
practices using qualitative approach as it may provide interesting findings. The following section will first 
discuss the method use in this study followed by the further discussion on the findings from the selected 
qualitative studies.   
 
2. Method 
In this study, we discuss the qualitative corporate governance literature by discussing the key findings from 15 
qualitative governance-related articles published in 2000-2013. To identify the studies using qualitative method, 
we searched for published papers on the Business EBSCOHOST database, Proquest database, SSRN website, 
and some other databases (i.e. Springerlink, Science Direct, Emerald). We searched through databases using 
several keywords such as „„audit committee,‟‟ „„director,‟‟ „„board,‟‟ “internal audit function,” “external audit,” 
and „„governance,‟‟ with the combination of these words with “qualitative”.  We only searched for published 
papers in 2000 or after since the corporate governance has been main concern after the high-profile corporate 
collapses in the new beginning of millennium (Brown & Caylor, 2006). We reviewed over 50 studies, but only 
discuss some of these studies which we believed have provided interesting new findings.  We primarily focus on 
research that pertains on how the board of directors, audit committee, internal audit function and external audit 
perform their roles in practice as well as the interactions among them. 
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3. Fundamental Insights from Literature Review 
We analyzed key insights from 15 qualitative studies that address the processes of corporate governance. These 
papers are O‟Higgins (2002), Roberts et al. (2005), Parker (2007), Brundin & Nordqvist (2008), Cohen et al. 
(2013), Soobaroyen & Mahadeo (2012), Cohen et al. (2002), Gendron et al. (2004), Turley & Zaman (2007), 
Beasley et al. (2009), Cohen et al. (2010), Salleh & Stewart (2012), Zain & Subramaniam (2007), Sarens et al. 
(2009) and McCracken et al. (2008). The summary of these studies are presented in Table 1 below. These 
studies cover different aspects of the corporate governance in literature. These studies focus mainly on the roles 
and responsibilities of the board of directors, audit committee, internal audit function, external audit and the 
interactions among these key mechanisms. Overall, these studies show how the qualitative study might present 
and discuss different outcomes from the quantitative studies. These studies address governance processes (for 
example, what roles that boards and audit committees actually perform and how they complete it), and not just 
focus on governance characteristics such as independence, diligence or financial expertise (see for example, 
Be´dard and Gendron, 2010;Schneider et al., 2009) which usually discussed in the quantitative studies.  
   O‟Higgins (2002), Roberts et al. (2005), Parker (2007), Brundin & Nordqvist (2008), Soobaroyen & Mahadeo 
(2012) focus mainly on the board of directors. These studies provide deeper, more current insights how the 
board actually do in performing their roles in the organization as well as improving the governance. Using 
interviews as a method of the study, O‟Higgins (2002) found that the incisive thinking, the ability to make a 
beneficial contribution to the company inside and outside the boardroom, and practical business experience are 
the most important characteristics of effective non-executive directors in Ireland. Roberts et al. (2005) who also 
focus on the non-executive director explore the effectiveness of boards through an examination of the work and 
relationships of non-executive directors. Whilst other study use the board composition to measure effectiveness, 
Roberts et al. (2005) argue that the actual conduct of the nonexecutive vis-a` -vis the executive that determines 
board effectiveness. Through the interviews with 40 company directors, Roberts et al. (2005) find that non-
executive‟s willingness to exercise independence is the key to effective board behavior. The results also suggest 
that traditional divisions between agency and stewardship theory do not adequately reflect the actual practice of 
the directors on board. The study concluded that corporate governance reform will be challenged as it not 
supports the actual effectiveness of boards.   
   Using a longitudinal complete member researcher (CMR) participant observer methodology, Parker (2007) 
examines internal governance processes in two nonprofit association boards. In particular, the study offers 
insider observational studies of boardroom behavior and the effectiveness of board functioning in the selected 
organization.  Overall, the results suggest that boardroom culture is important in the governance process. The 
analysis suggests that the chairing style by the director influences meeting effectiveness towards being informal 
and facilitating. Further, informality and humour are particularly important in lubricating directors‟ 
interrelationships, communication and cohesion. Meanwhile, Brundin & Nordqvist (2008) conducted a study to 
explore the role of emotions for board members in perform the board‟s control and service tasks. This study 
focuses on how long-term and short-term emotions work as power and status energizers in the boardroom. The 
results reveal that power and status are important to evoke emotions in interactions between board members. 
Short-term and long-term emotions are a basis of energy that influences board work, and that they are influential 
in the board members‟ task performance. 
   Finally, Soobaroyen & Mahadeo (2012) conducted 24 in-depth semi-interviews of board members in listed 
and non-listed companies to examine whether the corporate governance requirements have an impact on how 
accountability is perceived, understood and practiced by company board members in Mauritius. Generally, the 
findings of the study suggest that individualizing form of accountability and individualizing governance in 
companies in Mauritius have been developed since the changes in its corporate governance. This is evidenced 
by a renewed awareness of director‟s responsibilities to shareholders and the use of board committees to 
monitor managerial activities. 
   Numerous qualitative researches on governance have focused mainly on audit committee effectiveness and 
how the audit committees do their work. In this paper, we provide a few examples of published work that 
deepens our understanding and knowledge on the audit committee in practice. Among the study that discussed 
on the audit committee include Cohen et al. (2002), Gendron et al. (2004), Turley & Zaman (2007), Beasley et 
al. (2009), Cohen et al. (2010), Salleh & Stewart (2012) and Cohen et al. (2013).  
   Cohen et al. (2002), studying the influence of various corporate governance on the audit process, including the 
role played by the audit committee, found that auditors perceived audit committees are weak and ineffective in 
the post-SOX era. Cohen et al. (2002) can be regarded as the pioneer study which directly captures auditor 
experiences concerning their interactions with audit committees and boards of directors and the resulting effect 
on the audit process. Based on their interviews with 36 auditors, the findings indicated that auditors found audit 
committee members are lacked of expertise, power, and skepticism that would make them effective. Likewise, 
auditors frequently found audit committees to play a passive role. However, Gendron et al. (2004) who examine 
the practices in the audit committee meetings concluded that audit committee members have an awareness to 
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fulfill their responsibilities and they are dependent on the quality of the work performed by the company‟s 
internal and external auditors in fulfill their responsibilities. Through their interviews (Chief Executive Officer, 
Chief Financial Officer, chief internal auditor, partner in charge of the external audit engagement, chairperson of 
the audit committee, and audit committee members), they found that audit committee members place significant 
attention on a few matters during meetings (i.e. accuracy of financial statements; appropriateness of the wording 
used in financial reports; effectiveness of internal controls; and the quality of the work performed by auditors). 
They also found that the audit committee asking challenging questions and assessing responses provided by 
managers and auditors during the meetings. In an extension of their earlier study, Gendron and Bedard (2006) 
carry out additional interviews in year 2004 in order to develop an understanding on how the collapses Enron 
and Andersen impacted attendee‟s sense of audit committee effectiveness. From the interviews, they suggested 
that the attendee‟s configurations of meaning regarding audit committee effectiveness are constructed through 
four categories of processes. Among others, the background of audit committee members, ceremonial features 
of audit committee meetings, reflective interpretations of substantive practices and activities taking place during 
audit committee meetings and reflective understandings of informal practices taking place outside meetings. 
They concluded that audit committee members carry out diverse practices, in order to become comfortable with 
their company‟s internal controls.  
   Later, Turley and Zaman (2007) conducted a case study at a UK listed financial services company to examine 
the conditions and processes affecting the operation and potential effectiveness of audit committees. The 
findings revealed that audit committee have limited role in internal control matters due to audit committee‟s lack 
of detailed knowledge. However, the study provides the evidence on the significance of informal processes 
around the audit committee through which concerns might be raised.  The findings also document the influence 
of audit committee‟s power on other governance participants as well as the importance of the relationship 
between the audit committee with the internal audit functions and external auditors. In support to the Turley and 
Zaman (2007) suggestion of more qualitative research on the audit committee process, Beasley et al. (2009) 
used interview as a method to examine the audit committee oversight process in the post-SOX era within 42 US 
public companies. Through the interviews, the authors found that audit committees have good interactions with 
internal audit and external audit in assessing the effectiveness of internal control of the organisations. Besides, 
in some cases, there is evidence of the audit committee performing ceremonial roles. However, overall, audit 
committee members perceived that audit committees have the requisite financial expertise, meet frequently and 
for long time periods, and ask probing questions of management. 
   Additionally, a recent interview with auditors were conducted by Cohen et al. (2010) to gain insights on the 
audit process and the interactions between auditors and other corporate governance parties in the post-SOX 
environment. Findings documented that the auditors indicate significant changes in the corporate governance 
environment. In contrast to the findings in Cohen et al. (2002), the auditors note that audit committees have 
greater expertise and power as well as more conservative in fulfilling their duties. The audit committee members 
also play significant roles in overseeing internal controls, focusing on reporting quality, identifying risks, asking 
challenging questions, and overseeing the whistleblowing process. Similar results have been found by Salleh 
and Stewart (2012) who conducted the case study in seven public listed companies in Malaysia found that the 
audit committee provides assistance to resolve the dispute between management and auditor when the issue is 
very material. The understanding of their responsibilities, awareness of possible issues and the members‟ 
accounting and business expertise are the main factors that contribute to the audit committee act as a mediator. 
More recently, Cohen et al. (2013) extends Cohen et al. (2010) by provides insights on the effectiveness of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act through the interviews with 22 experienced directors from US. In particular, the study 
examines directors‟ experiences of the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the relationship among audit 
committee, external auditor and management as well as it impacts on internal audit, financial reporting quality, 
and corporate risk taking. Based on the interviews, the evidence reveals that the audit committee has assumed 
the monitoring role required by Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Further, the findings documented that Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
had positively impacted the quality of financial reporting. This finding is indirectly supported by the decline in 
major frauds since the establishment of the Act. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, however, had adversely impacted 
corporate risk taking. 
   Two studies (Zain and Subramaniam, 2007 and Sarens et al., 2009) provide deeper and more current insights 
into the interaction between audit committee and internal audit in organisation. Overall, these studies 
documented that the interactions between these two mechanisms are important in improving governance and 
internal control system of an organization. Zain and Subramaniam (2007) conducted in-depth interviews with 
the heads of the internal audit function in 11 publicly listed companies in Malaysia to provide insights on what 
the internal audits perceive of their interactions with audit committee. This study is particularly vital as it was 
conducted in developing country which is recognised as being characterised with a high power distance culture 
and thus, contributes to the extant literature on the interaction between audit committee with internal audit 
function. From the interviews, the results indicate that internal audit function having limited informal 
communications and limited private meetings with audit committee members. The results of the study also have 
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emphasized on the committee importance of having clear reporting guidelines for internal audit function. It also 
stressed on the importance of the development of better communication and leadership skills among audit 
members in order to improve the relationship between internal audit function and audit committee. This study 
has highlighted some of the findings that contrast with commonly assumed views on the interactions between 
internal audit functions and audit committees (see for example Gendron and Bedard, 2006 and Sarens et al., 
2009).  
   Focusing on the interactions between audit committee and internal audit functions, Sarens et al. (2009) 
provides insights on (1) what drives the audit committee to look for the support of the internal audit function; 
and (2) what makes the internal audit function an expert at providing comfort to the audit committee. From the 
data gathered through case studies in four Belgian companies, the findings show that audit committees seek 
comfort with respect to the control environment and internal controls through internal audit function‟s 
involvement in improving internal controls. Internal auditors‟ unique knowledge about risk management and 
internal control, combined with appropriate inter-personal and behavioural skills, enables them to provide the 
comfort to the audit committee members. In their study, Sarens et al. (2009) suggested for longitudinal research, 
to investigate how the needs for comfort on behalf of the audit committee change as the status of the risk 
management and internal control system and management‟s approach towards risks and internal controls change 
over time. 
   While other studies focus on the board of directors, audit committee and internal audit function, McCracken et 
al. (2008) has conducted a study to see the interactions and negotiation between the management and external 
audit. Even though the studies on this interaction are increasing, however it is still understudied, whereby most 
of these research focusing mainly on the audit partner. In particular, McCracken et al. (2008) focuses on actual 
chief financial officer- audit dyads (the two main negotiators) in discussing their responsibilities, relationships 
and the negotiation of a specific issue(s). The authors carried out an interview based field study of chief 
financial officer–audit partner dyads to analyze how the chief financial officers and their audit partners describe 
the negotiation of a specific accounting issue. The findings of the study show that audit firms manage the 
assignment of partners to engagements based on chief financial officer preferences and the chief financial 
officer remove the partners who are in poor relationships. It also reveals that the audit partner is always 
performing the roles according to the client‟s preferences to ensure the client management remains happy. This 
research provides understanding on how the roles and relationship are negotiated between the auditor and the 
chief financial officer. 
 
Table 1 Summary of Selected Qualitative Studies 
Author Title Objective Research Method Findings 
 (2002) 
(Board of 
directors) 
Non-executive 
O’Higgins 
Directors on 
Boards in 
Ireland: co-
option, 
characteristics 
and 
Contributions 
To analyse the selection 
and characteristics of 
nonexecutive 
directors in Ireland 
In-depth interviews and 
repertory grids with 26 
prominent non-executive 
directors and chairmen. 
The most important 
characteristics of 
effective non-executive 
directors were: (i) 
incisive thinking, the 
ability to size up a 
complex issue clearly, (ii) 
the ability to make a 
beneficial contribution to 
the company inside and 
outside the boardroom, 
and (iii) practical 
business experience. 
 
Cohen et al. 
(2002) 
(Audit 
committee) 
Corporate 
Governance And 
The Audit 
Process 
To examine the impact 
of various CG factors, 
such as BOD and AC 
on the audit process 
Semi structured interview/ 
36 practicing auditors( 11 
seniors, 12 managers, 13 
partners)/ big 5 firms 
- Auditors view 
management as the 
primary driver of 
corporate governance 
- corporate governance 
factors to be especially 
important in the client 
acceptance phase and in 
an international context. 
- ACs is typically 
ineffective and lack 
sufficient power to be a 
strong governance 
mechanisms. 
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Gendron et al. 
(2004) 
(Audit 
committee) 
Getting Inside the 
Black Box: A 
Field Study of 
Practices in 
"Effective" Audit 
Committees 
To provides insights 
into practices that audit 
committee members 
carry out in meetings, 
including the part of the 
meetings, including the 
part of the meetings 
where members meet 
privately with auditors. 
Field study in three 
Canadian public 
corporation (interviews to 
gather data on AC 
activities) 22 individuals 
(7 in corporation A; 8 in 
corporation B; 7 in 
corporation C) 
- Key matters that AC 
members emphasize 
during meetings, such as: 
accuracy of FS; 
appropriateness of the 
wording used in financial 
reports; effectiveness of 
internal controls; & the 
quality of the work 
performed by auditors.                   
– Key aspect of the work 
carried out by AC 
members consists of 
asking challenging 
questions and assessing 
responses provided by 
managers and auditors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Title Objective Research Method Findings 
Roberts et al. 
(2005) 
(Board of 
directors) 
Beyond Agency 
Conceptions of 
the Work of the 
Non-Executive 
Director: 
Creating 
Accountability in 
the Boardroom 
 
To examines board 
effectiveness through 
an examination of the 
work and relationships 
of non-executive 
directors. 
40 in-depth interviews 
with 
company directors, 
commissioned for the 
Higgs Review 
- Traditional theoretical 
divisions between agency 
and stewardship theory, 
and control versus 
collaboration models of 
the board do not 
adequately reflect the 
lived experience of non-
executive directors and 
other directors on the 
board. 
- Developing 
accountability as a central 
concept in the 
explanation of how 
boards operate effectively 
enables the paper to both 
challenge the dominant 
grip of agency theory on 
governance research and 
support the search for 
theoretical pluralism and 
greater understanding of 
board processes and 
dynamics. 
 
Turley & 
Zaman (2007) 
(Audit 
committee) 
Audit committee 
effectiveness: 
informal 
processes and 
behavioural 
effects 
To investigate the 
conditions and 
processes affecting the 
operation and potential 
effectiveness of audit 
committees (ACs), with 
particular focus on the 
interaction between the 
AC, individuals from 
financial reporting and 
internal audit functions 
and the external 
auditors. 
 
A case study approach - 
direct engagement with 
participants in AC 
activities (AC chair, 
external auditors, internal 
auditors, and senior 
management) 
- The importance of 
informal processes 
around the AC 
- Possibility that the AC‟s 
impact on governance 
may be greatest in non-
routine situation 
- Audit committee 
influence on power 
relations between 
organizational 
participants 
 
Parker (2007) 
(Board of 
directors) 
Internal 
Governance in 
the Nonprofit 
Boardroom: a 
participant 
observer study 
- To inductively 
identify the key 
characteristics of 
nonprofit boardroom 
internal governance 
processes from two 
observed cases 
Observation on internal 
governance processes 
within two non-profit 
boards 
(two-year study 
period took the form of 
personal involvement 
Boardroom culture 
emerges as a potent 
ingredient in the 
governance process 
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- To elucidate unique 
nonprofit patterns of 
board profile and 
performance 
management, agenda 
and discourse 
management, the 
board–CEO 
relationship and 
boardroom culture 
in and observation of 
approximately 80 per 
cent of all routine and 
special board meetings, 
and some associated 
director/management 
subcommittees) 
 
 
 
 
Author Title Objective Research Method Findings 
Zain & 
Subramaniam 
(2007) 
(Audit 
committee and 
internal audit 
function) 
Internal Auditor 
Perceptions on 
Audit Committee 
Interactions: a 
qualitative study 
in Malaysian 
public 
Corporations 
To provide insights into 
internal auditors‟ 
perceptions of their 
interactions with AC 
members in Malaysia. 
In-depth interviews of the 
heads of the internal audit 
function (HIAFs) from 11 
publicly listed companies 
- Indicate infrequent 
informal communications 
and limited private 
meetings between the 
HIAFs and ACs, and a 
need for clear reporting 
lines 
- ACs are seen to be held 
in high esteem for their 
authority and are 
expected to take on 
greater leadership in the 
inquiry of management‟s 
decision-making 
 
Brundin & 
Nordqvist 
(2008) 
(Board of 
diretors) 
Beyond Facts and 
Figures: The Role 
of Emotions 
in Boardroom 
Dynamics 
To understand how 
emotions matter when 
board members interact 
to perform their tasks 
Observation in a real-time 
setting over 18 months. 
- Empirical accounts from 
board meetings and diary 
notes from a CEO show 
in detail how emotions 
work as power energizers 
and status energizers in 
boardroom dynamics. 
- Short-term as well as 
long-term emotions are a 
source of energy that 
affects board work, and 
that they are influential in 
the board members‟ task 
performance. 
McCracken et 
al. (2008) 
(External audit 
and 
management) 
Auditor–client 
management 
relationships and 
roles in 
negotiating 
financial 
reporting 
To examine the 
assumption that the 
roles played by CFO 
and audit partner and 
the nature of the 
relationships are similar 
across negotiations 
Interview based field study 
of chief financial officer 
(CFO)–audit partner dyads 
(9 companies) 
Audit firms appear to 
manage the assignment of 
partners to engagements 
based on CFO 
preferences and remove 
those partners who are in 
„„poor‟‟ relationships, 
irrespective of why the 
relationship is considered 
by the CFO to be 
„„poor‟‟. 
Beasley et al. 
(2009) 
(Audit 
committee) 
The Audit 
Committee 
Oversight Process 
To provides extensive 
information about the 
AC process 
In-depth interviews (42 
individuals actively 
serving on US public co 
AC)/ Feb 2004- Feb 2005 
- AC members strive to 
provide effective 
monitoring of financial 
reporting and seek to 
avoid serving on 
ceremonial AC.  
- Responses vary with 
personal and company 
characteristics, with 
particularly notable 
differences related to AC 
members' accounting 
expertise and time of 
appointment to the AC 
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(pre-SOX versus post-
SOX). 
 
Sarens et al. 
(2009) 
(Audit 
committee and 
internal audit 
function) 
Internal audit: A 
comfort provider 
to the audit 
committee 
- provides insights on 
(1) what drives the 
audit committee to look 
for the support of the 
internal audit function; 
and (2) what makes the 
internal audit function 
an expert at providing 
comfort to the audit 
committee 
 
Four Belgian case studies 
(interviews with internal 
auditors and audit 
committee members) 
- Audit committees seek 
comfort, with respect to 
the control environment 
and internal controls, two 
areas in which they 
confront considerable 
discomfort. 
- internal audit function‟s 
traditional assurance role, 
its involvement in 
improving internal 
controls provides a 
significant level of 
comfort to the audit 
committee 
-Internal auditors‟ unique 
knowledge about risk 
management and internal 
control, combined with 
appropriate inter-personal 
and behavioural skills, 
enables them to provide 
this comfort. 
Author Title Objective Research Method Findings 
Cohen et al. 
(2010) 
(External audit 
and audit 
committee) 
Corporate 
Governance in 
the Post-Sarbanes 
Oxley Era: 
Auditors‟ 
Experiences 
 
- To capture the 
experiences 
of auditors in their 
interactions with the 
audit committee, board, 
and internal auditors in 
the post-SOX 
environment 
-  Focus on how such 
interactions affect the 
audit process (e.g., risk 
assessments and 
resolution of 
contentious accounting 
issues) and the audit 
environment (e.g., 
appointment and 
termination of auditors) 
Semi-structured interviews 
with 30 experienced audit 
partners and managers 
 
- AC are seen as having 
sufficient expertise and 
power to fulfill their 
responsibilities 
- There is a strong, 
positive shift post-SOX in 
the seriousness that AC 
members bring to their 
role as monitors of the 
quality of the financial 
reporting process 
 
Salleh & 
Stewart (2012) 
(Audit 
committee) 
The role of the 
audit committee 
in resolving 
auditor-client 
disagreements: a 
Malaysian study 
To report the findings 
of semi-structured 
interviews with 
management, external 
auditors and audit 
committee members in 
Malaysia concerning 
the role of the audit 
committee in resolving 
auditor-client 
disagreements 
 
 
 
Exploratory case study 
(interviews with an audit 
committee chair/member, 
the finance manager/CFO 
and the external auditor) 
- When the issue is very 
material, the audit 
committee plays a 
mediating role as a third-
party intermediary who 
provides assistance to 
resolve the dispute.  
- The authority of the 
committee to act as a 
mediator comes from its 
oversight responsibilities, 
its understanding and 
awareness of possible 
issues and the members‟ 
accounting and business 
expertise.  
- Mediation techniques 
used include controlling 
the agenda, gathering 
information, advising and 
solving problems 
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Soobaroyen & 
Mahadeo 
(2012) 
(Board of 
directors) 
Do corporate 
governance codes 
improve board 
accountability? 
Evidence from an 
emerging 
economy 
To examine whether the 
expectations and 
requirements 
contained within the 
corporate governance 
code have an impact on 
how accountability is 
perceived, understood 
and practiced by 
company board 
members in an 
emerging economy 
(Mauritius). 
24 semi-structured 
interviews of board 
members in listed and non-
listed companies and also 
analyses the accountability 
implications present in the 
local code of corporate 
governance and relevant 
reports. 
- Substantive change in 
the type of board 
accountability but it is 
one which privileges an 
individualising form of 
board interactions. A 
move to a more 
empowered “maximalist” 
board is also noted. 
Cohen et al. 
(2013) 
(Audit 
committee) 
The Effectiveness 
of SOX 
Regulation: An 
Interview Study 
of Corporate 
Directors 
Provides insights on the 
effectiveness of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(U.S. House of 
Representatives 2002) 
in promoting high-
quality financial 
reporting and good 
governance 
Interviews conducted with 
22 experienced audit 
committee directors from 
U.S. firms 
SOX has positively 
impacted the monitoring 
role of the audit 
committee (board), which 
directors attributed to the 
financial expertise and 
internal control 
requirements and 
heightened substantive 
diligence 
 
4. Conclusion 
From the literature, the corporate governance has grown rapidly in the past few decades. However, most of these 
studies are conducted using quantitative approach. Even though the qualitative studies in this area are growing, 
it is still understudied and there are various scopes that can be explore through qualitative studies. Majority of 
prior quantitative studies ignore the processes related with the key governance mechanisms activities. Generally, 
these qualitative studies deal with the impact of board of directors and audit committees (i.e. existence and other 
observable characteristics) on specific aspects of corporate governance through the several proxies. We observe 
that there is lack of publicly available data that would facilitate more quantitative research and accordingly, 
more qualitative research are needed in enhance understanding the impact of governance system.  Most of the 
prior studies call for more qualitative studies on the processes associated within the corporate governance 
(Turley and Zaman, 2004).  The qualitative studies are essential to complements the existing quantitative studies 
in this area by relying on the data derived from the case study, in-depth interviews, observations and other 
related methods. In this paper, we summarize some of the selective findings of qualitative studies in the 
literature.  
 
    From the discussions of the studies, these qualitative researches have deepened our understanding of the roles 
and responsibilities of the key governance mechanisms (i.e.board of directors, audit committee, internal audit 
function and external audit) and interactions among them. Overall, most of the research discussed in this study 
reveals an important roles play by the board of directors in the boardroom, audit committees interactions with 
external audit and internal audit function in improving their effectiveness in governance and how the external 
auditors maintain their relationship with the management which cannot be explore through the quantitative 
studies. The findings of these have important implications for practice. On an overall basis, the findings of these 
studies are supported focus on improved corporate governance which discussed by the regulators.  
   These 15 studies are generally suggested for more qualitative research on governance, largely motivated by 
limited qualitative research to date. For example, Turley and Zaman (2007) noted that there is a need for 
additional qualitative research on the audit committee process to enhance understanding on audit committee 
activities and its effects in practice. Similarly, Beasley et al. (2009) recommend for more qualitative research on 
the effects of internal audit oversight on the audit committee effectiveness. Qualitative research is necessary as it 
will help scholars and practitioners gain a better understanding of corporate governance phenomena. Roberts et 
al (2005) argue that both governance theory and governance reform need to be informed by primary qualitative 
research on key governance relationships. This is because through the field studies of governance practice, it 
enables researchers to verify the actual activities of governance mechanisms. Finally, the future researchers may 
consider a diversity of methodological options other than quantitative method, and particularly promotes the 
value of qualitative methods in corporate governance research.  
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